|
Smith Faculty
Opinion Article
|
May 21,
2008
|
|
By Dr. Peter Morici, Professor of
International Business
E-MAIL
WEB SITE
|
 |
Friday’s Home Sales
Report and the Sorry State of Banking
Friday, the National Association of
Realtors will report April existing home
sales and prices. These are expected to
continue the down trend of recent months
and reflect the sorry and dysfunctional
state of the banking industry.
Existing home sales and prices are
fundamental indicators of the vitality
of the housing market and significantly
affect consumer confidence and the
health of the economy. Until the Federal
Reserve instigates reform among the
major New York banks, housing prices
will remain depressed, and broader U.S.
economic growth will be lethargic.
In March, the annual pace of sales
was 4.93 million, down 2 percent from
the previous month and 19.3 percent from
a year earlier. The median price in
March was $200,700, a bit higher than in
February, but 7.7 percent lower than a
year earlier.
The NAR’s index of pending home sales
measures new contracts and provides a
forward looking indicator of final sales
one or two months in advance. Over the
last year, this indicator has slid
fitfully, and for February and March
combined it was down about 21 percent
from a year earlier.
Based on this information and other
soundings from the credit markets and
broader economy, my proprietary
forecasting model indicates existing
April existing home sales will come in
at about 4.84 million. The median prices
should fall to about $198,000.
Housing sales will remain well below
the 7.1 million posted in 2005 and
prices will continue to slide. During
the recent bubble, home and land prices
got out well in front of fundamentals,
such as household personal income and
housing density. But for creative
mortgages, which created huge profits
for New York banks and have since proven
poisonous, many sales would have never
been completed at the lofty prices
recorded in 2006 and early 2007.
The U.S. consumer faces a constant
drumbeat of bad news. Housing prices are
falling, gas prices are rising, good new
jobs are getting scarcer than hen's
teeth, and credit card terms are getting
tougher, even as the Federal Reserve
makes credit to banks cheaper.
Federal Reserve efforts to increase
liquidity and bank lending have not made
mortgages adequately more available,
especially in the Alt-A and subprime
categories. Alt-A loans are for
homeowners offering good repayment
prospects but either less-than-perfect
credit or recent income records.
Fannie Mae, generally, only takes a
limited number of nonprime lenders, and
cannot finance many upper-end, more
expensive homes. It certainly does not
finance the kind of liars loans, based
on fictitious assertions about home
values and buyer incomes, that
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch and others
bundled in bonds for sale to unknowing
fixed income investors to create
transactions fees, profits and huge
bonuses for executives.
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke's strategy has two components.
The Fed has lowered short-term interest
rates by slashing the Federal Funds rate
3.25 percentage points since September
2007, and the Fed has permitted banks to
use subprime-backed mortgage securities
to borrow from the Federal Reserve. The
latter is the so-called term auction
facility.
These policies do not solve the basic
problem, because these policies do not
provide banks with opportunities to
write many new non-Fannie Mae conforming
mortgages. Banks cannot provide the
housing market with adequate amounts of
mortgage financing by taking deposits,
writing mortgages and keeping those
mortgages on their portfolios. Bank
deposits are not nearly enough to carry
the U.S. housing market. Much the same
applies for loans to businesses.
In normal times, regional banks
bundle mortgages into bonds, so-called
collateralized debt obligations, and
sell these in the bond market through
the large Wall Street banks. The recent
subprime crisis revealed the large banks
were not creating legitimate bonds.
Instead, they sliced and diced loans
into incomprehensibly complex
derivatives, and then sold, bought,
resold, and insured those contraptions
to generate fat fees and million dollar
bonuses for bank executives.
This alchemy discovered, insurance
companies, mutual funds and other
private investors will no longer buy
mortgage-backed bonds. Banks can no
longer repackage mortgages and other
loans into bonds and are pulling back
lending. Home prices tank, consumers
spend less, businesses fail and jobs
disappear.
Private investors have taken massive
losses, and the large banks have taken
more than $150 billion in losses on
their books. This has left the banks
short of capital and in liquidity
crises. The banks turned to foreign
governments, through sovereign
investment funds, to sell new shares and
raise fresh capital, and to the Fed to
boost liquidity.
Neither the sovereign investment
funds nor Bernanke have required the
banks to change their business models,
which essentially pays bankers for
creating arcane investment vehicles that
generate transactions fees, rather than
writing sound mortgages and selling
simple, understandable mortgage-backed
securities to investors.
Rather than reform their business
practices to reenter the fixed income
market, Citigroup and other large
financial houses are scaling back or
abandoning mortgage finance, and
trolling financial markets for other
lucrative opportunities to write
derivatives that pay outsized profits
and huge bonuses.
Most recently we have learned
Citigroup’s hedge fund engineers have
been practicing slight of hand to sell
derivatives based on bank-owned life
insurance policies, bilking investors
and other banks for fees.
Until Citigroup and other major New
York banks abandon such tainted business
practices, the bond market virtually
remains closed to mortgage finance,
other than CDOs offered by Fannie Mae,
and cannot supply the volume and array
of mortgage products necessary to
support a full housing recovery.
The legislation to update regulation
for Fannie Mae and other federally
sponsored banks and provide additional
federal funds to assist these
institutions in working out troubled
mortgages will help but the private
banks must be reformed and revitalized
to fully finance a vibrant housing
market.
The economic stimulus package tax
rebates, interest rate cuts and
administration help for distressed
homeowners are useful. The stimulus
package is less than the losses taken by
private investors and the banks on CDOs.
Getting the housing market going and
the economy growing will require
Bernanke to aggressively pursue banking
reform. Without genuine changes in the
way Wall Street handles mortgages and
other loans, the economy can't get back
on track.
Peter Morici is a professor at the
University of Maryland School of
Business and former Chief Economist at
the U.S. International Trade Commission. ►More Faculty
Opinion Articles |